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## THE BASIS OF A DURABLE PEACE

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I take the opposite view of preparedness from that of Professor Patten. I do not believe that "consciously to prepare drags our social life down to the level of a border town" unless that means the level of such border towns as Geneva or the Hague. Nor that "the present war is a good illustration of how preparedness adds fuel to passions and makes conflict inevitable." Neither do I believe with Professor Patten that "economics can be trusted to uphold universal peace and give it a better basis than martial ideals" unless it be accompanied with a change in political organization. Neither do I agree with Professor Patten as to the disastrous effects of some form of universal military training. On the contrary, as an educator and as a believer in democracy, I am inclined to believe that a mild form of military training, which would be no more burdensome than the Swiss system, would not only make for preservation of peace within our borders, but would make for democracy by uniting all Americans in at least one common interest, and would supply a certain obvious defect in the moral training now furnished by our public school system. On the other side, I am ready to go farther than Professor Patten probably would be willing to go, in favoring a revision of the doctrine of sovereignty and the yielding of the right to make war to an international tribunal or a league to enforce peace.

Discussions of peace terms are premature. The war is not yet over. For Americans to assume that they will have much to say about the terms of peace, except in so far as those terms affect the rights of neutrals, would be justly resented by those who are bearing the burden of the war. If Washington's maxim, "avoid entangling foreign alliances" prevents us from lifting a finger to stay a cataclysm, certainly it should prevent us taking any part in the distribution of the plums. I take it, therefore, that in discussing the basis of a durable peace it is not intended that we should discuss the terms of peace which may conclude the present war; whether Germany

should keep Belgium or Alsace Lorraine, whether Poland should be independent, whether Servia should be annexed to Austria-Hungary, whether Germany's colonies should remain in the hands of France or England, returned to Germany, or made independent. Whether the peace to be concluded in 1917 or 1918 will endure until 2017 or 2018, will depend largely on what the terms of that peace are. Nevertheless, they are not our business.

We may, however, as political philosophers, subscribe to certain general propositions:

(1) A peace may be durable because protected by overpowering force.

(2) A peace may be durable because held in equilibrium by nicely calculated adjustments of the balance of political power.

(3) A peace may be durable because it rests upon justice and because the conditions which it creates are inherently reasonable.

We may even go further and say with the 100 German scholars—Harnack, Delbrueck, Dernburg and the rest—"We subscribe to the principle that the incorporation or annexation of politically independent nations, and people accustomed to independence is to be condemned" and even then have said little more than that freemen never shall be slaves and as for those who are slaves or vassals, it matters little whether they serve one master or another. Some of us would perhaps go even further and say with the Englishman Vernon Lee "to transfer a province is as undemocratic as to sell a slave."

Nor can we say that the only condition of a durable peace is the decisive defeat of one side or the other. If Germany is victorious a durable peace may come, backed by an invincible army and economic vassalage. If the allies win, a durable peace may come backed by nice balances of power and the limitations placed upon militarism. A drawn conflict might conceivably be followed by a century of peace, through a new alignment of the allies. Stranger things have happened in history than that Russia and Japan, England and Germany should make common cause. As President Tupper has recently said: "The cessation from war may be prolonged for a century through causes not one of which may be to the

honor of peace." No, it is unprofitable to be drawn into European family troubles, and to be made a divider of family estates between brothers.

What we have to consider is, first, how we may deliver ourselves as a nation from the fear of war and insure the durability of our own peace, and secondly, how we may free the world in the future from the social and economic disturbances which we, along with Europe, suffer through international conflict. This is a subject which has been discussed by wise men for 200 years. I have no solution to offer in twenty minutes.

Some good practical suggestions have been made which all must endorse:

(1) The freedom of the seas and immunity from capture of belligerents' goods will internationalize three-fourths of the globe.

(2) Provision for a year's delay before going to war, to let anger cool, is desirable but hardly practicable unless there is some way of stopping secret preparations in the meantime.

(3) A council of conciliation has proved useful in private industrial disputes and might help in national conflicts.

(4) Publicity in international negotiations which would permit public opinion to make itself felt before any acute stage was reached is to be encouraged.

If we want a permanent cure, however, we must go somewhat deeper.

In the interest of clear thinking, we ought to define the much abused word "peace." There are a good many of us interested in doing away with the settlement of international disputes by arms, who have no expectation of thereby terminating international conflicts. In our private life today, we have done away for the most part with the ready appeal to the revolver, the knife, or the lynching rope as a means of settling the conflicts of individual wills. But conflicts and the spirit of conflict remain. The economic struggle is severe. Conflict between various religious beliefs is by no means fought out. There is conflict between races, between Irish and Jews and Germans, between Italian and Swede and Japanese, and between white and black within our own nation in spite of durable peace, and those who believe that conflict and struggle is the order

of the universe, need have no concern lest if we abolish the crude appeal to gunpowder and the physical overpowering of the individual as a means of settling international disputes there will not remain international conflicts, hatreds, jealousies and strivings sufficient to fulfill any biologic law.

It is not a static condition which we have in mind, therefore, when we talk of a durable peace, but a cleared arena in which men may struggle in more diversified ways than the conditions of trench fighting or airships or submarines permit. And because the conflict possible in times of peace is so much more complex than the conflict possible in war, we must not be surprised that those who tire easily of mental intricacies are disposed to say, "better a clean-cut straight-out fight and be done with all subtleties and intricacies." "Better war with plain soldiers than peace under the leadership of the lawyers, scribes and pharisees." Fortunately, war itself is becoming so complex, so much a matter of nice machines, of rail-roading, of chemistry, of tunneling, of shooting at unseen foes and toiling in remote machine shops, that to the one who really understands war, it has lost a good deal of the appeal of the old straight-out man-to-man conflict, and is well nigh as tantalizing and baffling as the more complex conflicts of peace. Have nothing to fight about is not the only answer, therefore, to the question, how may we have a durable peace. There is the second answer. Accustom men to use different weapons in their conflicts. Both answers are said to be utopian. To some, the last seems the more utopian of the two, but to political philosophers, who, as Professor Patten has suggested, must be psychologists as well, the second seems perhaps less utopian than the first.

Those who believe in getting rid of the causes of war, say, if we want to preserve peace there must be no economic struggle between nationalities as such, that is, there must be no national tariff walls, no national spheres of influence. The watch word must be the open door. If we want to avoid conflict with Germany after the war, they say, don't shut out her goods, give her a chance to sell freely, and sell freely to her in exchange. If we want to avoid conflict with Japan, enforce the terms of our treaty, allow the Japanese to buy land in California, overcome the notion that a white skin is superior to a yellow one. Let the Philippines, they urge, go their own way and if Germany or Japan want them, thank God it is not

our concern. Avoid conflict of religious creeds by claiming nothing that the others will not concede. If anybody objects to the reading of the Bible in the schools, drop it. If anybody objects to a Christmas carol, drop it. If anybody objects to an Easter vacation, drop it. If economic conflict becomes too severe, form a trust and let the people pay. If the union threatens a strike, don't fight, give whatever they ask, the public will foot the bill. Get rid of struggle, of conflict, at any cost, especially conflict with the fellow who can fight. No price is too high to pay for industrial peace has become a maxim among insiders in the business world just as it has become a maxim that it never pays to go to law. Justice, they say, is a very dear commodity and the ideal only of the immature and inexperienced. In opposition to this tendency there are many who believe that a durable peace, bought at the price of sacrifice of ideals and convictions, would be bought too dear, who believe we are not here for the purpose of getting through life with as little discomfort and annoyance as possible, but that we are here to struggle, as all the rest of nature struggles, evolving through such struggle properly directed, into a higher civilization. "Instead of dreading international disputes as mere curses and dangers," as someone has said, "we must learn to regard them as we think of our differences in domestic politics, as the very springs of movement and change, and the proof that we are alive and are adapting ourselves to our environment."

But though the termination of struggle may not be our object, may we not reasonably inquire how international conflicts may cease to be conflicts of arms? To the scholar this does not seem so chimerical as to do away with the occasions of war. If it is the law of nations to struggle, it is also the law of the individual, and yet, we have gradually defined the conditions of that struggle for the individual. The revolver is still useful to the individual in his struggle, and yet we have said in many large cities you cannot even own a revolver. The fist has all the sanction of nature and yet its use is so much restricted by law that men will pay seventy-five thousand dollars to see two men use their fists on each other, so rare is the sight. Instinctive fighting, Professor Patten finds more meritorious than fighting which is the result of rational premeditation and yet European nations justify the hanging of the woman who shoots in defense of her child and the destruction of a whole

village for the shots of two or three men not in uniform. The view of German militarism is the very opposite of Professor Patten's view, nothing is more immoral than instinctive fighting. We are dealing in war, then, not with a natural necessary phenomenon but with a fiction created by the human mind; with a game which is played according to certain rules sanctioned by the reason not by emotion or natural instinct. A man in uniform may do what one out of uniform may not do. If a ship follows the natural instinct to escape, you may sink her and her passengers with good conscience, if she stops, you must give the passengers a chance for life. If a ship enters a neutral port, it may leave in twenty-four hours; but if it stays thirty, it stays for the war. Now, however much justification there may be in nature, in instinct, for simple conflict, there is no question that war, as we know it now, is the product of human reason, and as the product of human reason, it must be amenable to reason. Just as a corporation has not the natural rights which an individual has, but because it is the creation of law is subject to law, so war, as we know it today, because it is the child of mind, is subject to mind. If the law can say to a corporation, you cannot practice law, because you are not endowed with any natural rights, so reason, having contrived modern warfare, can say to it, you have ceased to be a reasonable tool for reason's purposes, you are outlawed. Why should questions arising out of our daily national life be settled by methods utterly extraneous to our normal national life? It is one of those misleading half truths to say, all government rests upon force, the power to hold the physical body and to destroy it.

The first step to a durable peace, therefore, is to convince men of the ridiculousness of war. The present war is being fought to determine whether anybody shall have the right to say *I am Lord*, and there is none beside me; whether anybody or any nation shall occupy so undisputed a lordship that the mere rattling of his scabbard shall determine international disputes. But will it settle that question? No nation will ever again on this planet be allowed to test its martial equipment in combat with some other nation with a fair field and no favor. The present war undoubtedly proves that Germany had the best military establishment, but it also proves that diplomacy and a fair judgment of world conditions are as important as a fighting machine. This will become still more evident when the Peace Council meets, for all recent wars have shown that the

fruits won by arms are likely to be filched by intrigue. The conflict will show that in the game played according to the rules including the rule which allows me to turn a neutral nation into a supply depot for munitions, including the rule which allows me to march non combatants in front of my soldiers and to use captives as laborers, the might of this group of nations is greater than the might of that group of nations. Now if there were no rules this would be an important and incontestible fact of nature to be accepted as such, and to be reckoned with accordingly. In primitive conditions, the man who can physically overpower you is undisputed lord, and any arrangement into which you may enter must recognize this fact. By nature the human male can dominate the female. If there were no rules to the game that would be a fact by which we must all make our reckonings, and some do go back to it when it comes to an argument on suffrage. But once you admit any rules to your game, once you rationalize your instinctive procedure, you have entered on a process to which it is difficult to set limits. If two nations can agree, we will only fight according to these rules, they can also agree we will not fight to kill at all. As long ago as David and Goliath, it was possible for tribes to fight by selected champions, and colleges can still limit their football teams to eleven men no matter how big the college. There is, therefore, in the essence of things, no inevitable necessity in warfare so far as the human reason can see any more than in college hazing or in class scraps.

Now the American people see this perhaps more clearly than other people, but how can they take advantage of their rational view of war? If we are sure that it is a game we do not want to play and if there are any other nations of the same mind, we can minimize the police business by joining hands; by following the procedure of the league to enforce peace; by providing an international court with an international army and navy to back its decrees.

What is the greatest theoretical obstacle to any such internationalism?

A false doctrine of sovereignty.

A false doctrine of what constitutes greatness.

A false doctrine of what is to be most admired and worshipped.

We have been taught that a state which was under any obligation to anyone, either by way of moral obligation or by contractual relation, is not free and is not a complete state. It has parted with

a portion of its sovereignty. Sovereignty knows no law. The more isolated, the more self-sufficient the state, the freer from interrelations, except with inferiors, the greater the state.

Now this is undoubtedly good natural theology as well as classic political theory. But with the help of Christian teachings, political philosophers have advanced to a point where they see that it is false. "The future of civilization after the war," says Lowes Dickinson, "will depend upon the decision of the question, whether it is their independence or their interdependency that the nations will stress." All modern civilization depends on complexity of relation not on isolation. The great man is not the man who sits isolated, but the man who is most tied up with other men. The man who stands to gain is not the man who never deals save with inferiors, but the man who is readiest to contract with his equals.

The ideal of devotion to country was as strong in the hearts of many statesrights men in relation to their State of Virginia or to North Carolina as it can ever be in the heart of any American toward America. If the states had realized the immeasurable difference between the confederation, and the United States under the constitution, doubtless they would never have given their consent. Yet we can see no moral dishonor in their surrendering the right to make war, thus impairing their right to sovereignty. When Chief Justice Marshall enlarged and made possible the concept of the people of the United States, he was sowing the seed which was to reach fruition in the Civil War and make this, once for all, a united people. "If we want to bring in internationalism," says Brailsford, "we must go behind powers, to the populations which are capable of thought on other than national lines." We must use Marshall's conception of sovereignty not politically organized, or at least transcending the political organization. This concept alone could justify international coercion. But this will not be enough unless you provide some machinery as a rudimentary organ at least through which this sovereignty can find expression.

Internationalism will come, it has been said, when we have the international mind. Perhaps we ought to say the international hand or tongue. It is not too early to sow the seed for it. The socialists and the tradesunionists will help. The first step is for us who are college professors to see that a true up-to-date doctrine of sovereignty is taught in our colleges and universities and from there it

will filter down and be taught in our public schools. Then our children will be ready to surrender, on behalf of this country, the right to make war, to an international tribunal.

Finally, we must combat with all of our powers the notion that war is the supreme form of tribal expression, that its biological and moral effects are benefits the race cannot spare, and that the game of killing, played according to rationalized rules, is an appropriate manifestation of the general cosmic struggle for rational man.

Much of our modern ideas of citizenship and nationality find their roots in the town life of mediaeval cities. One aspect of that town life we have neglected to our cost. It is the king's ban—proclaiming extraordinary penalties upon him who should disturb the peace of the city, and thus interfere with its freedom of trade. Peace thus came to be one of the highly prized privileges of cities and city dwellers in turbulent times, and where strife would naturally have broken out most easily, because of the arrival of strangers, and conflict of economic interests there, by the proclamation of the king's ban, peace did most prevail.

As a basis of durable peace and as a safeguard against future international conflicts, let us try to revive for our modern world trade market, the king's ban against any disturber of the peace.